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Canada and International Trade in
Culture: Beyond National Interests
Joseph Devlin*
INTRODUCTION
The United States and Canada trade with each other more
than any two other countries on earth.1 Part of this trade in-
volves cultural products, an important export industry for the
United States. 2 Unlike the United States, Canada is primarily
an importer of cultural products. Seventy-five percent of Cana-
dian cultural products are imported, and the vast majority
comes from the United States. 3 Foreign products in Canada ac-
count for 45% of book sales, 81% of English language magazines
on newsstands, 85% of film distribution revenue, and 94 to 97%
of theater screen time.4 This market dominance by the United
States troubles Canadians, who feel that their national culture
* J.D. Candidate, 2005, University of Minnesota Law School; Ph. D. 1995, Columbia
University; B.A. 1982, State University of New York at Albany.
1. Canada Border Services Agency, Canada-U.S. Trade Statistics, at
http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.calnewsroom/factsheets/2002/sep/stats-e.html (Sept. 2002).
"Canada is the largest trading partner of the United States, with US$411 billion in
two-way merchandise trade in 2000, representing over US$1.1 billion/day. US$179
billion in merchandise was imported into Canada from the United States during
that year. Six ports-of-entry process 70% of all U.S.-Canada trade." Id.
2. Michael Braun & Leigh Parker, Trade in Culture: Consumable Product or
Cherished Articulation of a Nation's Soul?, 22 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 155, 157-58
(1993); see Andrew M. Carlson, Note, The Country Music Television Dispute: An Il-
lustration of the Tensions Between Canadian Cultural Protectionism and American
Entertainment Exports, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 585, 585 (1997). "While imported
films accounted for only 2% of the domestic box office take in 1990, U.S. films ac-
counted for at least four of the top five films in 13 European countries and six Latin
American countries, plus Japan, Australia, and South Africa." Gene Koretz, Ser-
vices Are the Engine Pulling the Trade Express... And a Boffo U.S. Box Office
Abroad Rakes in Billions, Bus. WEEK, Sept. 21, 1992, at 22.
3. Braun & Parker, supra note 2, at 159.
4. Krista Boryskavich & Aaron Bowler, Hollywood North: Tax Incentives and
the Film Industry in Canada, 2 ASPER REV. INT'L Bus. & TRADE L. 25, 27 (2002).
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE
is being eroded.5 Canadians consider their culture to be particu-
larly susceptible to U.S. influence, due to similarities with the
United States in language and heritage, as well as geographic
proximity. 6 In response to this situation, Canada has adopted
various measures meant to protect its national culture. 7 It has
also negotiated cultural exemptions in the two major trade
agreements covering North America.8
The Canadian-U.S. tension over cultural products is part of
a wider controversy involving international trade and culture. 9
Difficulties have arisen in recent trade talks because of a wide-
spread unwillingness to entrust cultural preservation and de-
velopment to the international trading regime, and many coun-
tries have expressed the same desire as Canada to carve out an
exemption that will protect their distinct national heritage and
voice.10
This Note suggests that culture should be kept separate
from the standard international trading rules. The paradig-
matic ideas of competition and comparative advantage that un-
derlie the liberalization of the world market in goods and ser-
vices do not apply to the different structure and incentives of the
cultural "market." Moreover, the national interest paradigm
espoused by those looking to preserve culture may also be ill-
suited to the particularities of cultural production. Cultural
production is often unrelated to national concerns or identity, so
a preservation movement focusing on national identity will nec-
essarily ignore or distort large portions of that which it seeks to
protect. Nonetheless, the format of international trade negotia-
tions and obligations, including the legal structure of the World
Trade Organization (WTO), recognizes only these national con-
5. See Braun & Parker, supra note 2, at 162-64.
6. Id.
7. See discussion infra Part I.A.
8. See discussion infra Part I.C.
9. See generally Braun & Parker, supra note 2; Bryan Schwartz, Canadian
Cultural Policy in a World Context, 2 ASPER REV. INT'L Bus. & TRADE L. 1 (2002);
William Echikson, Europe's Film Industry Could Use a Dose of Realism, BUS. WEEK
INT'L EDITION, Mar. 9, 1998, at 17, available at 1998 WL 8131079; Jeffrey E. Garten,
'Cultural Imperialism' Is No Joke, Bus. WEEK, Nov. 30, 1998, at 26; Paul Magnus-
son, What a GATT Deal Won't Do, Bus. WEEK, Dec. 20, 1993, at 38; Joan Oleck, A
Tantrum over Kidvid, Bus. WEEK, Dec. 11, 2000, at 16; Blanca Riemer et al., Europe
May Slap a Quota on General Hospital, Bus. WEEK, Mar. 27, 1989, at 46; France,
Take Down the Barricades, Bus. WEEK INT'L EDITION, June 26, 2000, at 100, avail-
able at 2000 WL 7827405.
10. See Braun & Parker, supra note 2, at 167-75, 177-78; Garten, supra note 9;
David Dodwell, U.S. Filmmakers Focus on Uruguay Round: The Audio-Visual Trade
Tussle Has Come to a Head in Geneva, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 7, 1993, at 4.
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cerns. Therefore, national desire for cultural preservation will
have to serve as a second-best method for preserving commer-
cially vulnerable cultural productions in the face of increasing
international trade pressures.
Part I of this Note presents the history of Canadian preser-
vation measures, with reference to the U.S. response. Part II
discusses the differences between the basic economic theories of
trade and the nature of cultural production and trade. In addi-
tion, it presents the "national identity" argument for cultural
preservation, suggesting some shortcomings of this view. This
Note concludes by suggesting that the national interest in cul-
tural preservation, in spite of its shortcomings, can and should
provide the basis for recognizing the need for cultural protection
in a world of increased trade liberalization.
I. THE HISTORY OF TRADE IN CULTURAL COMMODITIES
BETWEEN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES
A. CANADIAN CULTURAL PROTECTIONS
Concerns about Canadian cultural dissolution and assimila-
tion into U.S. culture are not new. As early as the 1920s, the
United States had established dominance in the English-
language magazine market, and Canadians objected to this
state of affairs. 1 ' In the post-World War II period, the Massey
Report 12 detailed the Canadian view of the danger to its culture,
and provided justification for an array of subsidies for Canadian
cultural industries.' 3 These subsidies were meant to counteract
the impact of "the enormous sums spent on the arts by wealthy
U.S. business interests."' 4
With the advent and explosion of television broadcasting in
11. Richard L. Matheny, III, In the Wake of the Flood: "Like Products" and Cul-
tural Products after the World Trade Organization's Decision in Canada: Certain
Measures Concerning Periodicals, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 245, 254-55 (1998).
12. REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE
ARTS, LETTERS AND SCIENCES (1949-1951) (Can.) [hereinafter the Massey Report].
The Massey Report grew out of concerns about the increasing Americanization of
English Canada, and called for increased government intervention in limiting this
phenomenon. See Claude Be'langer, Readings in Quebec History: Massey Report, at
http://www2.marianopolis.edu/quebechistory/readings/massey.htm (1998). The
Massey Report was released in 1949, and advocated the creation of a Canadian
Council for the Arts. See Carlson, supra note 2, at 587.
13. Matheny, supra note 11, at 255.
14. Id.
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the 1950s and 1960s, these concerns became even more urgent
for Canadians. 15 Reacting to the growth of U.S. media imports,
Canada passed the Broadcasting Act of 1968.16 The Act created
a federal agency, the Canadian Radio Television and Telecom-
munications Commission (CRTC), which today issues broadcast
licenses and oversees Canada's centralized communications
network, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC). 17 The
CRTC also implements the measures meant to preserve the vi-
ability of the Canadian television industry, including national
content requirements. I8
These measures have provoked negative reactions from the
United States, including public statements that the measures
are economic protectionism masquerading as cultural preserva-
tion.' 9 Perhaps the most contentious dispute in regard to these
policies involved the CRTC's choice not to include Country Mu-
sic Television (CMT), a U.S. channel on Canadian cable, instead
choosing New Country Network (NCN), a Canadian country
music channel.20 CMT had been broadcasting in Canada for
some time, but this decision meant that it was required to stop
completely.2' CMT was allowed to appeal the decision, but the
court said that it had been on notice that its Canadian operation
could end if a Canadian entity was directly competitive with it.22
After losing the appeal, CMT complained to the U.S. Trade Rep-
resentative and boycotted Canadian country musicians in its
15. See Carlson, supra note 2, at 587-88.
16. Id. at 586-88. As of 1992, 80% of the Canadian population lived less than
100 kilometers from the United States border, easily within reach of U.S. television
and radio. John Herd Thompson, Canada's Quest for Cultural Sovereignty: Protec-
tion, Promotion, and Popular Culture, in NORTH AMERICA WITHOUT BORDERS?
INTEGRATING CANADA, THE UNITED STATES, AND MEXICO 271 (Stephen J. Randall
ed., 1992).
17. Id.
18. Broadcasting Act, R.S.C., ch. 11 (1991) (Can.). Currently, these measures
require 60% Canadian content for television programs broadcast from 6 a.m. to mid-
night, and the 6 p.m. to midnight segment must be at least 50% Canadian.
Schwartz, supra note 9, at 10. Restrictions on radio programming require 35% Ca-
nadian songs, a minimum percentage that has been continually increased over the
years. Joseph Weber, Does Canadian Culture Need This Much Protection?, Bus.
WEEK, June 8, 1998, at 37.
19. See Oliver R. Goodenough, Defending the Imaginary to the Death? Free
Trade, National Identity, and Canada's Cultural Preoccupation, 15 ARIZ. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 203, 207 (1998). Mickey Kantor, while serving as U.S. Trade Representa-
tive, suggested that Canadian cultural concerns were an "excuse to protect the fi-
nancial and economic viability of the Canadian industry." Id.
20. See Carlson, supra note 2, at 592-95.
21. Id. at 593-94.
22. Id. at 594-95.
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broadcasts. 23 The U.S. Trade Representative complained to
Canada about the situation, and there were threats of retalia-
tion that some believed could lead to an all-out trade war.24
However, CMT and NCN agreed to a joint venture, with CMT
owning 20% of the channel, the maximum under Canadian law
at that time.25 The agreement also called for CMT to eventually
control 33% of the channel, provided that the Canadian govern-
ment increased the foreign ownership allowance, which it later
did.26
Canada also imposes other restrictions on the importation
of cultural products. One of these is a restriction on foreign
ownership of cultural industries. 27 The Investment Canada Act
has covered foreign cultural investment since 1985.28 Invest-
ments in cultural industries of five million Canadian dollars or
more are scrutinized and will be turned down if they do not
benefit Canada. 29 This restriction has led to some high profile
disputes. For example, the U.S. bookseller Borders, Inc. was not
allowed to open a superstore in Toronto. 30 Although there was
some concern about the type of books that would be chosen for
such a store, the main issue was that Canadian booksellers
could not match the economies of scale of such a large retailer,
and would be edged out of the market.31
Canada's restrictions are not used solely against the United
States. In March 1997, Canada used its investment restrictions
to prevent a European firm from distributing foreign films in
Canada. 32 The Europeans objected, pointing out that U.S. firms
had been distributing films on a much larger scale due to grand-
23. Id. at 595. It defined "Canadian" as any artist who did not have an U.S.
recording contract, so CMT could continue to play videos of already popular Cana-
dian musicians. Id.
24. Id. at 595-96.
25. Id. at 596.
26. See Carlson, supra note 2, at 596-97.
27. Goodenough, supra note 19, at 214-16.
28. Investment Canada Act, R.S.C., ch. 28 (1985), amended by ch. 56, 1988 S.C.
2094, ch. 35, 1993 S.C. 1, ch. 44, 1993 S.C. 130 (Can.). This regulatory regime
represents a liberalization from the previous restrictions. Hale E. Hedley, Note, Ca-
nadian Cultural Policy and the NAFTA: Problems Facing the U.S. Copyright Indus-
tries, 28 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 655, 662 (1995); see also Goodenough, su-
pra note 19, at 214.
29. Goodenough, supra note 19, at 214-15; see Hedley, supra note 28, at 661-
65.
30. Goodenough, supra note 19, at 215.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 215-16 (describing the situation in detail).
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father clauses in trade agreements. 33 Unpersuaded, Canada did
not lift the restriction. 34
B. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND CANADIAN CULTURAL
MEASURES
Wishing to liberalize the huge volume of trade between
Canada and the United States, the two countries signed the
Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement (FTA) in 1988. 35
One of the most notable features of this agreement was an ex-
emption for Canadian cultural industries.36 This exemption cov-
ered:
[A] n enterprise engaged in any of the following activities:
a) the publication, distribution, or sale of books, magazines, periodi-
cals, or newspapers in print or machine readable form but not includ-
ing the sole activity of printing or typesetting any of the foregoing,
b) the production, distribution, sale or exhibition of film or video re-
cordings,
c) the publication, distribution or sale of audio or video music re-
cordings,
d) the publication, distribution or sale of music in print or machine
readable form, or
e) radio communication in which transmissions are intended for direct
reception by the general public, and all radio, television and cable tele-
vision broadcasting undertakings and all satellite programming and
broadcast network services. 37
Canada's freedom to protect its cultural industries, how-
ever, was not as clear as this language seems to suggest. In ex-
change for this concession, the United States was given a right
of retaliation under Article 2005(2) of the FTA. 38 Retaliation is
not limited to cultural products, which would be of limited use
since the United States imports few such products compared to
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 2, 1988, Can.-U.S., 27 I.L.M. 281 [hereinafter
FTA].
36. Id. art. 2005; see Braun & Parker, supra note 2, at 157-60; Goodenough,
supra note 19, at 216-17.
37. Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, R.S.C.
ch. 65, Part VII, art. 2012 (1988) (Can.), 1988 S.C. 1999.
38. FTA, supra note 35, art. 2005(2); see Schwartz, supra note 9, at 1-2.
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its large exports to Canada. 39 Instead, if Canada discriminates
against U.S. cultural industries, the United States may retaliate
with "measures of equivalent commercial effect."40 Though this
retaliation provision has never been used, the threat of its use
was significant in the CMT dispute. 41 Despite the possibility of
retaliation, the Canadian government has used the FTA cul-
tural exemption to continue to protect its native cultural indus-
tries, largely with impunity.
42
On Canada's insistence, the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), between Canada, the United States, and
Mexico, incorporated Canada's cultural exemption. 43 It also in-
corporated the retaliation provision.44 Although there was little
or no threat of an inundation of Canada with Mexican culture,
and hence the NAFTA exemption has had little practical effect,
inclusion of the exemption in one of the most important regional
trade agreements has lent credibility and momentum to the ar-
gument for a similar exemption in the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT).4 5
The status of cultural industries and products under the
WTO is much more complex. Aside from an exemption for films
under Article IV,46 GATT does not mention cultural industries.
47
France and other countries have taken the position that cultural
industries are services, not goods, and therefore not covered by
GATT. 48 A working party studied this question in 1961, but left
it unresolved.49 After much negotiation, it was decided that the
new General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)50 would
not liberalize trade in radio and broadcast/cable television pro-
39. Canada imports 75% of its cultural products, most of those from the United
States. Braun & Parker, supra note 2, at 159.
40. FTA, supra note 35, at art. 2005(2); see also Braun & Parker, supra note 2,
at 159.
41. See Carlson, supra note 2, at 595-96; supra notes 20-26 and accompanying
text.
42. See generally Schwartz, supra note 9.
43. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, art. 2106, Annex
2106, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]; see also Braun & Parker, supra
note 2, at 166-67.
44. NAFTA, supra note 43, at art. 2106, Annex 2106.
45. Braun & Parker, supra note 2, at 166-67.
46. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. IV, 61 Stat.
A3, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT].
47. Culture is not listed as one of the exceptions under Article XX. Id.
48. Braun & Parker, supra note 2, at 179; Goodenough, supra note 19, at 218.
49. Goodenough, supra note 19, at 218.
50. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Annex on Telecommunications, §
2(b), Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. 43 (1947).
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duction.51
The question of coverage by the WTO is very important for
the United States and Europe. The United States runs a trade
deficit with Europe in many economic sectors, but in entertain-
ment industries it has a surplus of eight billion U.S. dollars.52
Although the U.S. entertainment presence in European markets
has not reached the saturation level found in Canada, concern
for the situation has led to various protective measures. 53 The
most important of these is the European Union's "Television
without Frontiers" directive, which was adopted in 1989, shortly
after Canada was granted the cultural exemption in the FTA.54
The directive requires that 50.1% of member-state television
programming be of European Union origin. 55 Although there is
still a possibility of enforcement against this kind of measure
through the WTO's dispute settlement process, such an eventu-
ality is unlikely given the long history of non-enforcement and
the inevitable uproar that would result.56
However, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body has made an
important decision in this area, and has come down squarely in
favor of free trade over national cultural interests.5 7 In Can-
ada-Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, first a WTO
panel and then its appellate body found Canadian protective
measures for its magazine industry inconsistent with its obliga-
tions under GATT.58 The measures at issue were meant to pro-
tect the domestic magazine industry, which at the time con-
trolled only 18.6% of Canada's English-language market. 59 The
rules restricted the importation of split-run periodicals, which
are magazines that have the same editorial content as the U.S.
51. Lisa L. Garret, Commerce versus Culture: The Battle Between the United
States and the European Union Over Audiovisual Trade Policies, 19 N.C. J. INT'L L.
& COM. REG. 553 (1994). This decision allowed foreign content restrictions and
other cultural protective measures to remain in place. Id. at 554.
52. Braun & Parker, supra note 2, at 168.
53. Id. at 169-70.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 169. The quota does not include news, sports, game shows or adver-
tising. Id.
56. See Goodenough, supra note 19, at 218-19.
57. WTO Report of the Appellate Body, Canada-Certain Measures Concerning
Periodicals, June 30, 1997, WT/DS31/AB/R, 1997 WL 398913 [hereinafter Periodi-
cals AB Report]; WTO Report of the Panel, Canada-Certain Measures Concerning
Periodicals, March 14, 1997, WTJDS31[R, 1997 WL 371097 [hereinafter Periodicals
Panel Report].
58. Periodicals AB Report § VIII; Periodicals Panel Report paras. 5.29, 5.39,
6.1.
59. Matheny, supra note 11, at 247.
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editions, but contain Canadian advertising.60 The Canadian
Magazine Publishers Association claimed that allowing foreign
advertisers to infiltrate the Canadian advertising market could
have a devastating impact on the Canadian magazine indus-
try.6 1 Tariff Code 9958 created a barrier to foreign split-run edi-
tions, but Time Warner found a way around the border restric-
tion by sending the editorial content of Sports Illustrated into
Canada via satellite and then combining it with the Canadian
advertising.62 In response, the Canadian government passed
Bill C-103, which attempted to close this loophole by imposing
an 80% tax on Canadian advertising in publications with foreign
content.63 The United States then complained to the WTO, and
eventually the panel and the appellate body decided against
Canada. 64 Although the decision dealt a blow to the assumption
that GATT would not be used to enforce free trade in cultural
industries, there has been no rush to establish panels question-
ing broadcast quotas and other cultural measures. 65 This may
be because magazines are a more tangible product than broad-
casts, so the appellate body had no problem classifying them as
goods rather than services.66 Also, given the importance of
these cultural issues to many countries, there may be political
60. Customs Tariff, R.S.C., ch. 41 (3d Supp.), § 114, sched. VII, item 9958
(1996) (Can.) [hereinafter Tariff Code 9958]; Act to Amend the Excise Tax Act and
the Income Tax Act, ch. 46, 1995 S.C. (Can.) [hereinafter Bill C-103]; Matheny, su-
pra note 11, at 255-56.
61. Matheny, supra note 11, at 256-57. The Canadian Magazine Publishers
Association points out that the U.S. magazines, such as Sports Illustrated, have al-
ready recovered production costs in the United States, which means that producing
an edition in Canada costs almost nothing. Id. This is a huge competitive advan-
tage. Id. Robert Lewis, editor-in-chief of the Canadian magazine, Maclean's, sug-
gests that such competition will force Canadian publications to spend less money on
generating Canadian-specific content. Id. at 257.
62. Id. at 259.
63. Bill C-103, supra note 59; Matheny, supra note 11, at 259.
64. Periodicals AB Report § VIII; Periodicals Panel Report paras. 5.29, 5.39,
6.1. Indirect postal subsidies, which were also part of the legislative scheme, were
struck down as well. Id.; Canada Post Corporation Act, R.S.C., ch. C-10, §5 (1985)
(Can.). The appellate body decided against Canada on all three issues considered.
Periodicals AB Report §VIII. First, the measures were viewed as a quantitative re-
striction that violated GATT Article III. Matheny, supra note 11, at 260. Second,
the postal subsidies were also found to violate Article III because of their indirect-
ness and non-transparency. Goodenough, supra note 19, at 221. Finally, the meas-
ures were also found to be in violation of Article 111:2, since the products in question
were "directly competitive or substitutable." Matheny, supra note 11, at 262.
65. Goodenough, supra note 19, at 219. However, for a discussion of the threat
of further challenges to other cultural industries, see Matheny, supra note 11, at
267-68.
66. Periodicals AB Report § TV; see Goodenough, supra note 19, at 219-20.
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considerations at work in the choice to avoid disputes. The Ca-
nadian response to the decision has been to shift its support for
its magazine industry to a domestic subsidy format, thus avoid-
ing censure under GATT.67
C. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CULTURAL TRADE BETWEEN
CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES
Important changes have occurred in the past few years in
the relationship in cultural trade between Canada and the
United States.68  One of the most striking and important
changes has been the rapid expansion of Canada's film and
video production industry. 69 As two commentators have ex-
plained, "Vancouver currently ranks third behind Hollywood
and New York City as a North American film production centre.
As a result of the recent production boom, Montreal has gone
from four local film crews to 28 in the space of a decade."70 In a
turnaround from the situation prompting the cultural protection
measures, this increased economic activity is coming at the ex-
pense of the U.S. video production industry. 71 Many of the pro-
ductions are what the U.S. industry calls "economic run-
aways"-films and television programs that move to Vancouver,
Canada's "Hollywood of the North," to save money.72 Popular
U.S. television shows, such as the X-Files, and well-known films,
such as Good Will Hunting and Murder at 1600, have taken ad-
vantage of less expensive Canadian production costs. 73 The Ca-
nadian federal government and the governments of provinces
such as Manitoba have created generous tax incentives to spur
67. Schwartz, supra note 9, at 2. In addition to the expense, it has been sug-
gested that this solution might lead to the magazine industry developing depend.
ency on the government. See Matheny, supra note 11, at 267. Although the indus-
try was already dependent on the government for continuation of the protective
measures, a direct subsidy, which can be easily increased or decreased each year,
might make that dependency more controlling. Id.
68. See generally Boryskavich & Bowler, supra note 4; Bonnie J. K. Richardson,
Technological Change and Canada/U.S. Regulatory Models for Filmed Entertain-
ment, 25 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 353 (1999).
69. Boryskavich & Bowler, supra note 4, at 30-31. A similar, although not as
dramatic, development has been reported in the European and Mexican film indus-
tries. Echikson, supra note 9; Elisabeth Makin, Movie Cameras Are Rolling
Again... with Some Help from the State, Bus. WEEK INT'L EDITION, June 12, 2000
at 4.
70. Boryskavich & Bowler, supra note 4, at 31.
71. Id. at 34.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 30-31.
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this development.7 4 It is not clear, however, how much of the
increased activity in Canada is caused by these governmental
measures and how much by the cheap Canadian dollar, as well
as quality locations and infrastructure.7 5
This change in the Canadian video industry has been seen
as part of a larger change in the Canadian view of cultural in-
dustries.7 6  One commentator has noted that "[i]n recent
years... Canadian government at all levels has undergone an
attitudinal shift in regard to the cultural industries and has
adopted the U.S. view of cultural products as tradable economic
commodities that have the potential for generating substantial
revenues for the state."77 One important example of this new
viewpoint is the Tomorrow Starts Today program, which pro-
vides five hundred million Canadian dollars in funding for the
arts, 78 partly to promote cultural exports. 79 However, this new
view has not eliminated the previous justification for, or interest
in, cultural preservation.8 0 For example, Canadian productions
of U.S. subjects do not contribute to Canadian culture in the
way that a production on a Canadian subject would. In addi-
tion, since the Manitoban video production tax cut was passed
in 1997, foreign production has doubled, but domestic produc-
tion has actually declined.8 1
In spite of changed attitudes about cultural industries and
trade, the Canadian government still sees cultural protection as
a high priority, but now seeks to pursue that goal in tandem
74. Id. The likelihood of objections to these measures under Canada's interna-
tional agreements depends on which measure is being looked at. The federal incen-
tives are open to foreign corporations, so there is no violation of national treatment
obligations. Id. at 37-39. National treatment requires countries to treat imports
the same as domestic products. JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 479-81 (4th ed. 2002). However, some prov-
inces' tax plans are only open to domestic corporations. In Manitoba, for example,
foreign companies must either create a Manitoban subsidiary or work with a local
company. Boryskavich & Bowler, supra note 4, at 38. Both options make production
more cumbersome and costly than it is for domestic companies. Id. Boryskavich
and Bowler provide useful appendices detailing the Canadian and U.S. tax incen-
tives available for video production. Id. at App. A & B.
75. Boryskavich & Bowler, supra note 4, at 36.
76. Id. at 25.
77. Id.
78. Tomorrow Starts Today, at http://www.canadianheritage.gc.ca/special/
tomorrowstartstoday/en-intro.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2004).
79. Schwartz, supra note 9, at 2.
80. Boryskavich & Bowler, supra note 4, at 40; Schwartz, supra note 9, at 1-2.
81. Boryskavich & Bowler, supra note 4, at 33.
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with promoting its own cultural trade.8 2 The shift in policy can
most clearly be seen in the recommendations of the Cultural In-
dustries Sectoral Advisory Group on International Trade (Advi-
sory Group).8 3 The Advisory Group suggested that the govern-
ment could follow two distinct paths: (1) continued use of the
"cultural exemption strategy used in the past, which takes cul-
ture 'off the table' in international trade talks"; or (2) promotion
of "a new strategy that would involve negotiating a new interna-
tional instrument that would specifically address cultural diver-
sity, and acknowledge the legitimate role of domestic cultural
policies in ensuring cultural diversity."84
This "new international instrument"8 5 is similar to what is
often referred to as a General Agreement on Trade in Culture
(GATC).86 The creation of a GATC is seen as addressing the
concerns of both sides in this trade debate.8 7 Cultural preserva-
tion would be allowed where it is necessary, but industries that
have developed sufficient competitiveness would not be pro-
tected. "By accepting that culture is unique and addressing it in
its own forum, the fears of cultural imperialism on the one side
and blatant protectionism on the other will be eradicated."8 8
The future of the Canada-U.S. trade relationship in this
area is uncertain. In addition to the possibility of a future
GATC agreement, some commentators have suggested that con-
tinuing technological advancement will make protectionism in-
creasingly difficult and even futile.8 9 There is also the possibil-
82. Schwartz, supra note 9, at 2-3; Boryskavich & Bowler, supra note 4, at 39-
40.
83. New Strategies for Culture and Trade: Canadian Culture in a Global World,
February, 1999, Cultural Industries Sectoral Advisory Group on International Trade
(Can.), available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/canculture-en.asp (last vis-
ited Sept. 19, 2004) [hereinafter New Strategies]; see Boryskavich & Bowler, supra
note 4, at 40.
84. New Strategies, supra note 83, available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca
/tna-nac/canculture-en.asp (last visited Sept. 19, 2004).
85. Id.
86. See Braun & Parker, supra note 2, at 188-91.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 191.
89. See, e.g., Richardson, supra note 67, at 353; Lisa Jeffrey, The Impact of
Technological Change on Canada's Affirmative Policy Model in the Cultural Industry
and New Media Sectors, 25 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 379 (1999). A good example of this phe-
nomenon can be seen in the facts of the Canadian Periodicals case. Sports Illus-
trated used satellite technology to send the editorial content into Canada and then
combined it with the Canadian advertising. Matheny, supra note 11, at 255-56.
This technique circumvented the Canadian border controls on the importation of
split-run periodicals. Id.
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ity of increased enforcement under the existing international
agreements. 90 The one certainty is that this issue will continue
to create problems between Canada and the United States until
a resolution is reached.
II. INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND CULTURAL
PRESERVATION: STRUCTURAL DIFFICULTIES
A. COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY:
INAPPROPRIATE PARADIGMS FOR FOSTERING CULTURAL
PRESERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT
Some scholars have suggested that the economic theory of
comparative advantage, which provides the primary rationale
for continuing trade liberalization, does not provide a suitable
means for furthering the goals of cultural preservation and de-
velopment. 9 1 These scholars would likely agree with Canadian
Minister of International Trade Art Eggleston's assessment that
a magazine "should not [be] looked at. .. like a widget."92 How-
ever, none of these scholars have explained fully why standard
economic theory does not encompass the priorities and incen-
tives involved in cultural productions. 93
Scholar David Ricardo's theory of comparative advantage,
the backbone of the free trade rationale, assumes the interna-
tional interchangeability of the goods produced, 94 but this inter-
90. The Tomorrow Starts Today program, for example, could be seen by the
WTO as using an impermissible export subsidy. See GATT supra note 50, at art.
XVI(1).
91. Braun & Parker, supra note 2, at 174; Matheny, supra note 11, at 273-74.
Developed more than 150 years ago by David Ricardo, the theory of comparative ad-
vantage holds that a nation should manufacture those goods that it can produce effi-
ciently compared to other goods, and then can trade with other nations to obtain the
goods that it is comparatively inefficient at producing. See JACKSON ET. AL., supra
note 73, at 7-14.
92. Matheny, supra note 11, at 271. Eggleston made this comment in regard to
the Periodicals case. Id.
93. See supra note 90. In fact, scholars have begun to question the accuracy of
the comparative advantage model for any products, claiming that the international
mobility of capital undercuts its assumptions. See Sara Dillon, A Farewell to 'Link-
age" International Trade Law and Global Sustainability Indicators, 55 RUTGERS L.
REV. 87, 112-13 (2002). But since comparative advantage is the underlying justifi-
cation for the international trading system, this Note begins with this concept. It
argues that regardless of whether comparative advantage holds for widgets, it does
not explain Walt Whitman.
94. See DAVID RICARDO, On Foreign Trade, in THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL
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changeability is noticeably absent in cultural production. A tex-
tile can be woven in any country. The raw material may be site-
specific, but the textile factory can be located anywhere, and the
entrepreneur arranging the work will choose location based on
comparative advantages in labor and infrastructure.95 How-
ever, there is no way that a German novelist can exploit a com-
parative advantage in Norwegian fiction. Leaving aside linguis-
tic difficulties, which are themselves a significant factor,
cultural productions are rooted in the culture that produces
them. Occasionally, an artist is able to cross cultures suffi-
ciently to produce meaningful work in a different tradition.96
But these examples always involve individuals who actually be-
come part of the culture they are expressing. A composer who
lives her entire life in New Jersey is not going to write a great
Russian opera.9 7 In order to understand the issues, concerns,
and predilections of a culture, it is necessary to dwell inside it.
Thus, one of the key assumptions underlying the international
trade regime-internationalism of production-is inapplicable
to the cultural realm.
This dichotomy of rootedness versus internationalism can
be useful in understanding the implications of the recent boom
in the Canadian film and television industry.98 Referring to
Vancouver as the "Hollywood of the North" is even more accu-
rate than it first appears. The "economic runaway" productions
are not Canadian in the sense of their cultural content. Some
Canadian cultural influence may seep in, but these are still Hol-
lywood productions with Hollywood scripts, Hollywood produc-
ers, and Hollywood directors. 99 Thus, a portion of such a cul-
tural product may be internationally tradable, but there
remains an irreducible creative component that is linked to its
place of origin. And even as the video production industry in
Canada is thriving, productions of Canadian subjects have actu-
ally declined. 100 This disconnect between the Canadian industry
ECONOMY AND TAXATION ch. VII (3d ed. 1821).
95. See JACKSON, ET. AL., supra note 73, at 7-14.
96. Samuel Beckett and Eugene Ionesco, an Irishman and Romanian who be-
came exceptional French playwrights, are notable examples. Another example
would be Vladimir Nabokov, a major Russian novelist who became a major U.S. nov-
elist.
97. Or, if she does, the amazement with which such a feat will be greeted will
prove the point.
98. Boryskavich & Bowler, supra note 4, at 30-31.
99. See id.
100. Id. at 33.
[Vol. 14:1
2004] CANADA AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN CULTURE 191
and Canadian subject matter illustrates that the economic goals
furthered by free trade are not the same as the cultural goals
that Canada and other nations claim to be pursuing. Given the
political importance of economic prosperity, countries may settle
for preservation that is more financial than cultural.
In addition to the problems with comparative advantage, it
has been suggested that consumer choices with regard to cul-
ture do not fit the rational actor assumption-another central
tenet of the economics underlying the international trading sys-
tem and all free markets. 0 1 However, this view misunder-
stands the special meaning that economists give to the term "ra-
tional."102 Consumers are never assumed to be acting rationally
in the sense of acting reasonably.1 0 3
A person who pays sixty thousand dollars for a military ve-
hicle to drive to the grocery store is arguably not acting rea-
sonably. However, such a consumer may be acting rationally in
regard to personal attitudes, desires, and beliefs. 104 The fact
that those attitudes, desires, and beliefs may not themselves be
rational is not the economist's concern. So when a consumer
buys a ticket for the remake of The Texas Chainsaw Massacre0 5
instead of going to see a subsidized showing of Children of
Paradise,0 6 this is perfectly rational behavior, in economic
terms. However, the rational actor assumption as played out in
momentary consumer gratification cannot serve as an adequate
pricing mechanism for cultural worth.107
Even though the rational actor assumption does explain
consumer choices in regard to culture, that does not mean that
those "rational" choices should be the only decisions determining
which cultural products should be preserved and supported.
Even Chainsaw Massacre fans, as well as purchasers of com-
mercially popular culture involving fewer dismemberments,
may want to have other forms of entertainment available, even
if they do not patronize them often enough to ensure commercial
101. See Carlson, supra note 2, at 614-15. The rational actor concept assumes
that individuals will act rationally in any economic situation in order to maximize
benefits for themselves. This is sometimes referred to as "economizing behavior."
JAMES D. GWARTNEY, RICHARD L. STROUP & RUSSELL S. SOBEL, ECONOMICS:
PRIVATE AND PUBLIC CHOICE 11 (9th ed. 2000).
102. See GWARTNEY, STROUP & SOBEL, supra note 101, at 15.
103. See id.
104. Id.
105. THE TEXAS CHAINSAW MASSACRE (New Line Cinema 2003).
106. LES ENFANTS DU PARADIS (Pathe 1945). This film is widely considered one
of the classics of world cinema.
107. See Braun & Parker, supra note 2, at 174.
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viability.
Thus, the argument that the market can be trusted to
choose those forms of culture that people want, making any non-
market support unnecessary, I 08 ignores the possibility that a
community may have other priorities besides immediate gratifi-
cation in its choice of cultural productions. To put it in economic
terms, culture can be viewed as a long-run activity that will not
be optimally developed if it is forced to compete on a short-run
basis. 109 Cultural history is full of examples of artists whose
contributions were not considered economically worthwhile dur-
ing their lifetimes.110 In the international trade context, Cana-
dian television could produce meaningful and lasting work, but
not if it is forced off the air and out of production by the same
U.S. shows that are seen worldwide.11' Television is a particu-
larly apt example of this issue, since the problem of immediate
gratification versus quality has been commented on for some
time in regard to television programming. 112 The struggle to
present quality programming on an intra-national basis is akin
to the international trade issue. Both involve the concept that
the dictates of the market cannot be allowed to exclusively con-
trol what viewers see.
This is not to say that Canadian or other national work will
be superior to the productions that the world market favors in
the short term. Questions of aesthetic worth are notoriously
subjective, and one person's formulaic genre picture is another
108. See Schwartz, supra note 9, at 4-5.
109. One of the generally recognized complications to market economics involves
short-run versus long-run outcomes. GWARTNEY, STROUP & SOBEL, supra note 101,
at 70. For example, a firm that creates inferior quality products and cuts prices may
prosper in the short-run, but in time consumers will become aware of the problem
and switch to other brands. However, if the other brands have gone out of business
in the meantime, then the market has not priced the goods accurately, due to lack of
information. This problem undercuts the assumption that free markets are always
efficient.
110. Some good examples would be Vincent Van Gogh, Gerard Manley Hopkins,
and practically any poet who lived before 1950. Additionally, although influential
and well-known among the ruling elite, Geoffrey Chaucer could never have made a
living off his poetry, and so relied on the English Crown for support. See Martin M.
Crow & Virginia E. Leland, Chaucer's Life, in THE RIVERSIDE CHAUCER xv-xxvi (3d
ed. 1987).
111. According to some estimates, 70% of television entertainment shows in
Europe are of U.S. origin. Steven Greenhouse, Europe Reaches TV Compromise;
U.S. Officials Fear Protectionism, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1989, at D20.
112. See, e.g., JOHN O'NEILL, PLATO'S CAVE: TELEVISION & ITS DISCONTENTS
(Rev. ed. 2002); EYSENCK, H. J., SEX, VIOLENCE AND THE MEDIA (1978).
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person's classic. 113 The point is not to protect the "good" culture
from the crass U.S. onslaught, as some commentators have
characterized it,114 but to preserve different sources of culture.
The situation can be analogized to one of the standard justifica-
tions for the U.S. system of federalism. The states are seen as
having partial autonomy as a way of allowing for separate
"laboratories" for policy innovations.11 5 Whether or not public
policy innovation benefits from this honeycomb configuration,
cultural innovation certainly does, as evidenced by Samuel
Beckett's Waiting for Godot.116
One can look at cultural preservation not as a method for
combating U.S. culture or mass culture in general, but as a way
to ensure that U.S. or mass culture is not the only option. If it
were to become so, the cultural consumers of the world would be
immeasurably poorer. This consideration should be kept in
mind in relation to the Canadian Periodicals case. 117 Even cas-
ual reading matter, such as a magazine, is a part of the unique
113. See, e.g., THE TEXAS CHAINSAW MASSACRE (Vortex 1974). This is the origi-
nal version of the film, and some people consider it to be a classic of the horror
genre.
114. See Goodenough, supra note 19, at 207-08; see also BARBARIAN INVASIONS
(Miramax Films 2003). There may be objectionable aspects to U.S. mass culture,
particularly intellectual vacuity and the glorification of violence, but those can be
viewed as aspects of its immediate gratification appeal, and do not have to be con-
sidered as unique to the United States. The same pressures have been imposed on
non-U.S. productions; consequently, those productions have also gone down this
road. See, e.g., ANATOMIE (Sony Pictures Entertainment 2000) (a graphic thriller
involving human dissection); LE PACTE DES LOUPS (Universal Focus 2002) (a graphi-
cally violent monster/adventure tale). In addition, it is important to remember that
reality television was originally a European idea. The recognition that this kind of
cultural change is an economic process, and hence not necessarily tied to any na-
tionality, is key to understanding how to manage it.
115. New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting); see also Sandra Day O'Connor, Testing Government Action: The Promise of
Federalism, in PUBLIC VALUES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 35, 41 (Stephen E. Gottlieb
ed. 1993).
116. The play was written by an Irishman whose family's ancestry was British,
and was first performed in Paris. It is now a classic of French, British, and Irish
drama. MARTIN ESSLIN, THE THEATRE OF THE ABSURD 20-21 (Rev. ed. 1969). If
there were not different British, French, and Irish cultural milieus, this would not
have happened. In fact, the small and culturally distinct Irish nation produced an
inordinately large proportion of important English language playwrights and writ-
ers in the twentieth century. See, e.g., BEN FORKNER, MODERN IRISH SHORT
STORIES, at 21 (1980). If earlier British attempts to stamp Ireland with its own cul-
tural image had been more successful, eventual consumer choice in fiction, poetry
and drama would have been severely curtailed. See R. F. FOSTER, MODERN
IRELAND: 1600-1972 (1988).
117. Periodicals AB Report; Periodicals Panel Report.
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE
context of a separate cultural reality, and universal sameness of
input will lead to universal sameness of output. 118 The issue
can be thought of in economic terms as an example of positive
externalities that the immediate market does not recognize. In-
dividual Canadians are not thinking of future cultural produc-
tion when they choose a magazine, but distinctive cultural ex-
pression can be prospectively affected by such decisions.
The assumption that consumer preference will fail to sup-
port the "right" culture could be seen as judgmental and elitist,
but every country with sufficient financial wherewithal pursues
policies motivated by this very assumption. 119 The near univer-
sal existence of governmental entities such as the National En-
dowment for the Humanities and the National Endowment for
the Arts demonstrates that almost every developed country
views commercially vulnerable cultural productions as an area
of human endeavor that cannot be trusted entirely to the mar-
ket. And the fact that such entities exist in the United States,
the country that is most vocal in insisting on the tradability of
culture, proves the point even more strongly. Even the United
States does not behave as though culture is merely a tradable
commodity, and does not trust its own culture to the vagaries of
the market. 120
In addition to U.S. governmental support, there are numer-
ous private foundations and endowments. 121 In fact, Canadian
governmental support for the arts was originally justified as
118. The question of whether the Canadian protective measures were really
necessary to preserve the Canadian magazine industry is a separate issue. See
Goodenough, supra note 19, at 244-48. The type and efficacy of government policies
aimed at cultural preservation is a question for determination by a nation's officials
and voters. The issue here is Canada's power to impose measures, not the wisdom of
individual measures imposed.
119. The National Endowment for the Humanities and the National Endowment
for the Arts are U.S. examples of institutions created on the basis of this assump-
tion. See National Endowment for the Humanities, at http://www.neh.fed.us; Na-
tional Endowment for the Arts, at http://www.arts.endow.gov. Examples overseas
include the Arts Council of Great Britain and the Danish Arts Foundation, as well
as many more. E.g., Arts Council of England, at http://www.arts.council.org.uk;
Danish Arts Agency, at http://www.kunststyrelsen.dk/dOOOc/GSID/210614.
120. Although the United States does subsidize culture in certain areas, Bonnie
Richardson points out that there are many "untold stories of Hispanic Americans or
Asian Americans or African Americans. ... Canadians have the benefits of govern-
ment subsidies to help insure that such local and regional stories are told. U.S.
filmmakers who want to tell these stories do not benefit from U.S. government sub-
sidies." Richardson, supra note 67, at 355.
121. The MacArthur Foundation, the Ford Foundation, the Carnegie-Mellon
Fund, and the Pew Charitable Trust are all good examples of this.
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balancing the large U.S. private support. 122 Although some
might view private support as more consonant with free market
principles, the motivations involved have nothing to do with
standard consumer behavior and are much closer to the reasons
that governments support culture. In both situations, a deter-
mination is made that short-term purchasing behavior and its
economic results will not perform the desired function of ade-
quately supporting commercially vulnerable cultural activity.
Therefore, non-market support is provided.
Omnipresent government programs and widespread private
giving for non-market support of cultural activity show that this
activity is a standard priority for societies around the globe.
The international trading regime should recognize this priority
and thus reduce the resistance to trade liberalization. 123
B. NATIONALIST CONCERNS AND THE PRESERVATION OF CULTURE
The structure and procedures of the WTO ensure that the
only cultural interests that will be addressed are those tied to
national interests. The WTO is a gathering of States, not peo-
ple. Individuals and companies do not have access to its adjudi-
cative body, and can only become involved through their na-
tional governments.1 24 The successive rounds of negotiations
that have led to the current regime were carried on by represen-
tatives of national governments, and the next round will be as
well. 125 For these reasons, the WTO is not cognizant of interests
not directly connected to national concerns. Although this
would seem to be stating the obvious, it is important to recog-
nize the structure of the primary regulatory body involved in
this dispute, and understand whether the processes and incen-
tives built into that structure are likely to yield the desired out-
come: cultural preservation.
As an addition to the nation-centered legal debates about
the international trading regime, this Note also has focused on a
national issue, cultural preservation measures in Canada. The
Canadian measures themselves are primarily nationalistic in
purpose. 126 The Canadian government officials who propose and
implement such measures do not justify them on any other ba-
122. Matheny, supra note 11, at 255.
123. See Braun & Parker, supra note 2, at 189-91.
124. See generally JACKSON ET. AL., supra note 73.
125. See id. at 226-31.
126. Braun & Parker, supra note 2, at 160-64.
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sis.127 Scholars who discuss the issue and support Canada's po-
sition also invariably do so by reference to nationalistic con-
cerns. 128 The entire debate occurs within a conceptual frame-
work bound by the assumption that culture is primarily a
national concern, and that the boundaries of what we recognize
as separate and distinct "cultures" are the same as the bounda-
ries of nations. 129 Such an idea is preposterous, as even a cur-
sory glance at the cultural reality of Canada itself reveals. 130
And recognition of the cultural existence of separate ethnic en-
claves does not encompass the phenomenon either, since cul-
ture, broadly understood, is not synonymous with ethnicity. 131
A circle of talented graphic novelists who meet in a local bar to
talk shop can be a cultural grouping, and if their voices are lost
due to the inundation of international mass culture, it does not
matter whether they are in Toronto or Tarrytown.
Some of the Canadian measures meant to support and pro-
tect culture provide good examples of this problem. The exclu-
sion of European films from Canadian screens in the name of
national culture arguably did not serve the interests of Cana-
dian consumers or Canadian culture. 132  The issue is not
whether the European films were better or worse than their
U.S. competition, but simply that they were different from the
omnipresent U.S. fare. 133 In this case, the national government
may have been concerned about its most important trading rela-
tionship-with the United States-so it did not choose to deal
with the problem by reducing U.S. screen time. 134 So these na-
tional concerns were not cultural concerns, though they claimed
to be.
Another example of this disconnect between national and
127. Id.
128. See Matheny, supra note 11, at 257-59; Braun & Parker, supra note 2, at
188-91.
129. See supra notes 123-27.
130. The province of Quebec forms a strongly distinctive cultural canton within
the Canadian nation, as do many Native American groups. See generally ALLAN
SMITH, CANADIAN CULTURE, THE CANADIAN STATE, AND THE NEW CONTINENTALISM
(1990).
131. Ethnicity has an inescapable hereditary aspect, but culture is not so lim-
ited. See WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 444, 628 (2nd ed.
1983).
132. If one of the main purposes of protecting Canadian culture is to reduce the
influence of U.S. culture, then barring European influences, which would otherwise
complicate and broaden the overall cultural environment, is actually counterproduc-
tive.
133. See supra note 110.
134. See Goodenough, supra note 19, at 215-16.
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cultural interests is the changing attitude among some Cana-
dian officials about cultural industries.135 The increasing ten-
dency to see cultural productions as potential sources of profit in
international trade will probably have some positive conse-
quences, but it demonstrates the existence of a primary gov-
ernment motivation that can be at odds with cultural preserva-
tion. 136 Governments will likely choose jobs and income over
culture. 137 Indeed, their tenure in office would probably be
rather short if they did not. One main reason why cultural pro-
tection is so popular with governments is that it is usually also a
form of economic protection. But when profit and cultural pres-
ervation are at odds, such as when the Vancouver video indus-
try makes a pile of money by creating U.S. products, cultural
protection will not interfere with the ability to make that
money. Thus, assuming that national governments are stake-
holders whose interests are completely aligned with the world-
wide interest in the preservation of culture would be a mistake.
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, protection of culture can be viewed as further-
ing one of the primary goals of ongoing liberalization of trade in
other sectors-presenting the world's consumers with more and
better choices. As with liberalization, this goal is partly at odds
with the national sovereignty of the member states charged
with its achievement. Nationalistically motivated preservation
will sometimes fail to yield positive results for either domestic or
international consumers of culture, in the short or long run.
This is why international negotiations on this subject, whether
or not they are meant to result in a General Agreement on
Trade in Culture, should only be undertaken with an under-
standing that the structure of the system involved is inadequate
to encompass the externalities involved.
Although the nation-state is not an entirely trustworthy
advocate for the preservation of commercially vulnerable culture
in world trade, it is the only stakeholder that has standing in re-
lation to the WTO. Therefore, it must serve as a second-best op-
tion in avoiding the increasing uniformity of mass culture by
protecting all that is counter, spare, original, and strange. Any
135. See discussion supra Part I.C.
136. See discussion supra Part II.B.
137. See discussion supra Part I.C.
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negotiations on trade in culture should recognize the limitations
of nation-based preservation. Such negotiations must not only
involve government officials and experts on trade, but also ex-
perts on culture. Otherwise, we will not only have a Hollywood
in California and Vancouver, but everywhere on earth.
